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 Kant makes a striking reference to Spinoza in the 1788 Critique of Practical Reason. If, 
Kant claims, his own idealism about space and time “is not adopted, nothing remains but 
Spinozism, in which space and time are essential determinations of the original being itself, 
while the things dependent upon it (ourselves, therefore, included) are not substances but 
merely accidents inhering in it” (2nd Critique 5:102; Kant 1996, 221).1 That is, Kant states that 
the best alternative to his own metaphysical system is Spinoza’s radical substance monism, 
according to which everything inheres in a single substance.  
 This passage motivates two questions: (a) how deeply did Kant engage with Spinoza’s 
philosophy and (b) how close are their philosophical views? I believe that the answer to (a) is, 
disappointingly: “not much.” Despite that, I believe that the answer to (b) is: “on some points, 
surprisingly close.” Together, these answers raise further historical questions about why Kant 
and Spinoza’s views sometimes converge and further philosophical questions about those views’ 
plausibility. Spinoza and Kant were proudly independent thinkers, so any points of near-
convergence between them deserve philosophical attention. 
 I begin by investigating whether Kant directly concerned himself with Spinoza, 
focusing on Omri Boehm’s recent study (the most extensive case in the literature for thinking 
that Kant was deeply concerned with Spinoza). I argue that Boehm’s case is not convincing. I 
then turn to identifying two philosophically interesting points on which Spinoza’s and Kant’s 
views come surprisingly close: (1) their arguments for the limitations of our sensory knowledge 
and (2) their arguments for the timelessness of the mind.2 
                                                            
1 All references to the first Critique will use the standard A/B format. References to Kant’s other works will 
be to volume and page number of the Academy edition (Kant 1900), with abbreviated titles. All translations 
are from the Cambridge edition of Kant’s works. 
2 I focus on metaphysical issues, since most of Kant’s references to Spinoza concern metaphysics (Kant 
considers the epistemology of “Lichtenberg’s Spinoza” in the Opus Postumum (e.g., 22:54-5)). I do not 
discuss Kant’s references to Spinoza in the third Critique (e.g., 5:393-4), since these obviously betray 
Kant’s ignorance of Spinoza’s actual views on teleology (cf. E1App.).  See Marshall 2010 for an additional 
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 My discussion has a limited scope. In 1785, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi ignited a heated 
debate by arguing that Spinozist pantheism was the inevitable and absurd result of philosophy, 
with special focus on Kant.3 After 1785, Kant could not avoid discussion of Spinozism, and the 
above remark from the second Critique must be understood in this context. My concern here is 
with Kant’s relation to Spinoza’s actual philosophy, however, not the broadly Spinozist themes 
of the Pantheism Controversy. Moreover, Kant established the main tenets of his theoretical and 
practical philosophy before 1785. Aside from the above passage from the second Critique, I 
therefore bracket most of Kant’s post-1785 references to Spinozism. 
  
1. Was Kant Engaged with Spinoza’s Philosophy? 
 
 Omri Boehm has recently argued that Kant closely engaged with Spinoza’s claims and 
arguments.4 Boehm focuses on Kant’s first Critique, specifically, the Transcendental Dialectic, in 
which Kant criticizes traditional, ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics. Kant’s scattered references to Spinoza 
justify this textual focus. When Kant discusses Spinoza up through 1785, he is almost always 
concerned with Spinoza’s substance monism. So if Kant were genuinely engaged with Spinoza’s 
philosophy, it would probably be in his criticisms of dogmatic metaphysics. The first Critique 
(first published in 1781) is Kant’s main presentation of those criticisms. 
The Dialectic offers both a general account of dogmatic metaphysics and discussions of 
specific metaphysical issues: the soul (the ‘Paralogisms’), the ‘world whole’ (the ‘Antinomies’), 
and God (the ‘Ideal’). In my view, Boehm’s most compelling arguments concern Kant’s general 
account of dogmatic metaphysics and the Ideal.5 In this section, I discuss each of those, before 
returning to the striking passage from the second Critique. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
potential point of metaphysical overlap between the two and Marshall 2017 for comparisons of their 
metaethical views. Spinoza’s argument in E4p72d has struck some commentators as Kantian, but Cooney 
(Unpublished) compellingly argues that it is not. Israel 2011 offers an influential discussion of Spinoza’s 
and Kant’s political philosophies. 
3 For three more detailed discussions, see Beiser 1987, Franks 2005, and Lord 2011. 
4 In his Introduction, Boehm implies that that Kant “read Spinoza” and “consider[ed] the Ethics worthy of a 
philosophical reply” (Boehm 2014, 1). Boehm also emphasizes that Kant had access to Spinoza’s views via 
works like Pierre Bayle’s 1697 Dictionnaire, and suggestively states that “it would be tempting, for every 
philosophically inclined thinker, to read Spinoza for themselves” (Boehm 2014, 2). Elsewhere, however, 
Boehm grants that Kant was concerned with a Spinozism which “may not correspond exactly to Spinoza’s 
own system” (Boehm 2014, 147). Given my purposes, I take Boehm’s intended conclusion to be the one 
suggested by his Introduction. 
5 Boehm argues that Kant’s First and Third Antinomies concern Spinoza’s views. As Boehm himself 
allows, though, if the Antinomies are meant to address Spinoza, they reveal significantly 
misunderstandings (Boehm 2014, 81, 91, 131). Moreover, Kant suggests that the Antinomies reflect 
general metaphysical tendencies, not any particular metaphysician’s views (see A411/B438, A465-
72/B493-500).  
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1.1. Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics 
  
Boehm claims that “Kant’s critique of reason [is] a critique of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason; specifically, of the Spinozist (rather than Leibnizian) application and the Spinozist 
consequences of that principle” (Boehm 2014, 6-7). The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), on 
Spinoza’s best-known formulation, states that “[f]or each thing there must be assigned a cause, 
or reason, both for its existence and for its nonexistence” (E1p11d). This strong principle is 
central to Spinoza’s metaphysics.6 Therefore, if Kant were engaged with Spinoza’s philosophy, 
we would expect that his general characterization of metaphysics would hinge on the PSR. An 
examination of the text suggests otherwise, however. 
 Dogmatic metaphysics, Kant holds, arises from an illusion in which we confuse a 
legitimate subjective demand of reason with an objective principle, thereby wrongly taking 
ourselves to have a priori metaphysical insight. The subjective demand is “to find the 
unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding” (A307/B364). This is a demand 
to discover all the explanatory conditions for the objects we experience, such as the causes of 
events and the substrata of properties. The demand is ontologically neutral – as an imperative, 
it does not entail that any conditions exist. However, Kant claims that the demand acquires 
psychological force only when we assume “that when the conditioned is given [i.e., exists], then 
so is the whole series of conditions… which is itself unconditioned, also given” (A307-8/B364). 
Dogmatic metaphysics arises then, on Kant’s view, because we confuse a rational need for 
complete explanations with an a priori insight into there being rationally satisfying endpoints of 
explanations. 
 Boehm claims that the subjective demand and the objective principle are “nothing but 
formulations of the PSR” (Boehm 2014, 51). Kant suggests that connection elsewhere 7 and, in a 
related unpublished note, declares that “Spinozism is the true consequence of dogmatic 
metaphysics” (R6050, 18:436). So, Boehm suggests, there are strong textual reasons for 
thinking that Kant was specifically concerned with Spinoza in the Dialectic’s general account of 
dogmatic metaphysics. 
However, Kant’s objective principle, which he claims is the source of dogmatic 
metaphysics, is much weaker than Spinoza’s PSR. Consider again Spinoza’s statement of the 
PSR in E1p11d: “[f]or each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, both for its 
existence and for its nonexistence” (E1p11d). Spinoza’s principle applies to all things, whereas 
                                                            
6 For an influential PSR-focused reading of Spinoza, see Della Rocca 2008. 
7 “On a discovery” (8:193-8). 
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Kant’s objective principle claims only that conditioned (dependent) things have explanatory 
bases. Kant’s principle seems undeniable: surely, if something dependent exists, then so does 
everything on which it depends. That apparent undeniability is why Kant claims that 
metaphysical illusion “cannot be avoided at all” (A297/B354). By contrast, Spinoza’s PSR would 
be denied by anyone who thinks there are brute facts about what exists. 
 Kant thinks the objective principle yields radical metaphysical conclusions only in 
conjunction with further claims about specific conditioning relations. These further claims 
concern the representation “I think” (see A341/B399), the parts of space and time (see 
A412/B439), causation (see A414/B441-2), and contingency and necessity (see A415/B442, cf. 
A571-6/B599-605). For example, Kant holds that we are drawn towards the metaphysical 
conclusion that infinitely many times have passed by the objective principle together with the 
claim that every time depends on a preceding time. On Kant’s account, therefore, traditional 
metaphysics does not hinge on a strong PSR, but instead on a relatively weak principle about 
conditions and quite strong principles about particular dependence relations. The picture of 
dogmatic metaphysics that Kant offers is therefore quite un-Spinozistic. This is evidence that 
Spinoza was not central to Kant’s understanding of traditional metaphysics, and so that Kant 
was not seriously engaged with Spinoza’s views – even though he surely took his general 
characterization of rationalist metaphysical tendencies to apply to Spinoza. A further piece of 
evidence for non-engagement is the fact that God appears late in Kant’s account of dogmatic 
metaphysics (after, e.g., immortality), whereas God is central to Spinoza’s metaphysics. This 
brings us to our next topic. 
 
1.2. Kant’s Transcendental Ideal and Spinoza’s God 
 
 In the Ideal of Reason chapter, Kant claims that one inevitable idea of reason is that of a 
most real being (God), which “contains as it were the entire storehouse of material from which 
all possible predicates of things can be taken” (A575/B603). Such a being thereby “grounds 
every thing as the condition of its thoroughgoing determination” (A573/B601), that is, of 
everything’s being such that “of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can 
apply to it” (A571/B599). The rough idea is that, for every property P, any real thing is either P 
or not-P, and that this principle seems meaningful only if some entity generates or supports a 
non-empty set of properties. In the Critique, Kant denies we can prove this being’s existence, 
though he gives the idea of it an important regulative role in our thought (this is a retreat from 
Kant’s 1763 Only Possible Argument in Support of the Existence of a God, where he took similar 
considerations to demonstrate God’s existence). The Critique, then, holds up the idea of an 
5 
ultimate ground of possibility as rationally valuable. This idea is at least broadly Spinozistic, 
since Spinoza makes God the explanatory ground of everything. Boehm claims that the mature 
Kant therefore endorses a “regulative Spinozism” (Boehm 2014, 58). 
 Others besides Boehm have seen a connection to Spinoza here. As Boehm notes, Jacobi 
claimed he realized that all philosophy leads to Spinoza based on Kant’s Only Possible Argument 
(Boehm 2014, 18). Recently, Andrew Chignell sparked a debate about whether Kant’s 1763 
proof implies, a la Spinoza, that everything is a property of God.8 There is therefore at least 
some similarity between Spinoza and Kant on this topic. 
  My current concern, though, is whether this similarity indicates that Kant 
meaningfully engaged with Spinoza’s philosophy. By comparison: Kant also adopts Plato’s talk 
of ideas in the Dialectic, mentioning Plato explicitly (see A313-27/B370-4), but his engagement 
with Plato’s actual views there is minimal. Similarly, there are at least three reasons to think 
that Kant’s engagement with Spinoza on this point was at most superficial. 
 First: Kant’s focus is on how one arrives at the idea of God from the given possibility of 
finite things. In 1763, he saw this as a proof for God’s existence, whereas in 1781 he saw it 
instead as the inevitable course of reason under the influence of metaphysical illusion. Spinoza, 
however, does not define God in terms of possibilities, and his proofs for God’s existence make 
no appeal to the given possibility of finite things (see E1d6 and E1p11d). To be sure, Kant took 
himself to be identifying an underlying source for earlier rationalists’ ideas of God, but his 
account does not seem sensitive to Spinoza’s actual views.9 
 Second: Kant’s interest in the source of possibility depends on his view that finite things 
are contingent. He shows no interest in necessitarian views like Spinoza’s, according to which 
nothing is contingent (E1p29). Yet Spinoza’s necessitarianism is the most conspicuous feature of 
his modal metaphysics. If Kant were seriously engaged with Spinoza on this point, we would 
expect him to engage with necessitarianism. Yet he does not. 
 Third: Almost all of Kant’s early explicit references to Spinoza concern substance 
monism. So if the Ideal were concerned with Spinoza, one would expect a significant discussion 
of monism. Taking God to be the ground of possibility does not obviously push in the direction 
of substance monism. Consider, for example, Descartes’ view, on which God makes space 
possible and creates genuine spatial substances. If Kant were engaging with Spinoza on this 
point, then we would expect him to contrast substance monism with views like Descartes’. But 
Kant does not. 
                                                            
8 See (e.g.) Chignell 2014, Hoffer 2016. 
9 Kant mentions Spinoza in the Only Possible Argument (2:74), but only in an off-hand example. 
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 Kant’s discussion of God as the ground of possibility does not, therefore, indicate that he 
was meaningfully engaged with Spinoza’s actual philosophy. 
 
1.3. Why is Spinozism the Alternative to Kant’s Idealism? 
 
 Why, then, does Kant claim that if the “ideality of space are time is not adopted, nothing 
remains but Spinozism”?10 This discussion occurs three years after the start of the Pantheism 
Controversy and talks of Spinozism generally, but perhaps a close examination of the passage 
will reveal some genuine engagement with Spinoza. Kant makes the remark while arguing that 
only his idealism about space and time makes it “possible to affirm freedom without 
compromising the natural mechanism of actions” (2nd Critique 5:102). So why does Kant think 
that Spinozism is the best alternative to his idealism?11 The main non-ideal alternative to 
Spinozism that Kant mentions is Moses Mendelssohn’s view that space and time are “conditions 
necessarily belonging only to the existence of finite and derived beings but not to that of the 
original being” (2nd Critique 5:101). Mendelssohn clearly takes some finite beings to be 
substances. Hence, Kant is focused on two claims: 
 
(a) God is spatiotemporal. 
 
(b) Some finite beings are substances. 
 
Mendelssohn denies (a) but affirms (b), while the Spinozist affirms (a) but denies (b).12 Kant 
seems to think are the two best realist views.13  
                                                            
10 This privileging of Spinozism is especially surprising in light of Kant’s claims (Lectures on Religion, 
28:1052) that Spinoza’s monism leads to “crude contradictions” implying that either I am either God 
(which “contradicts my dependency”) or an accident (which “contradicts my concept of my I”). 
11 Brewer and Watkins 2012, Massimi 2017, and Messina (Unpublished) offer alternative approaches to 
this passage from what I suggest below, while giving useful historical background (none find Kant 
meaningfully engaging with Spinoza). All three focus on freedom, whereas I do not think freedom is 
crucial to Kant’s privileging of Spinozism. Massimi takes Kant to just borrow a use of “Spinozism” from 
Alexander Baumgarten. 
12 Spinoza himself, though, states that God’s existence “cannot be explained by duration or time” (E1d8). 
13 What would be worse about accepting both (a) (or a merely temporal version of (a)) together with (b)? At 
5:101, Kant implies that such a view yields an unacceptable fatalism, but the same is supposedly true of 
any realist view (see Bxxvii-xxix). Perhaps Kant’s implicit thought is that accepting (a) and (b) implausibly 
posits God as just one (spatio-)temporal substance among others, whereas Mendelssohn’s and Spinoza’s 
views would not. For somewhat related points, see Brewer and Watkins 2012, 168-9, 185 and Massimi 
2017, 77. 
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 Kant provides two reasons for preferring Spinozism over Mendelssohnianism. The first 
is that “I do not see how [the Mendelssohnians] would justify themselves in making such a 
distinction” (2nd Critique 5:101), that is, in limiting spatiotemporality to finite things in 
themselves. Kant does not elaborate on why this distinction or limitation would be problematic. 
After all, couldn’t God’s infinitude and perfection provide some reason for differing from finite, 
imperfect creatures in spatiotemporality? One possibility is that Kant is assuming some general 
metaphysical continuity principle here, such as Spinoza’s claim that “the laws and rules of 
Nature, accord to which all things happen… are always and everywhere the same” (E3Preface, 
cf. A657-8/B685-6).14 Another possibility is suggested by Kant’s discussion of space and time in 
the B edition of the first Critique. Kant asks “with what right” a realist can deny that space and 
time condition God’s existence, given that space and time “as conditions of all existence in 
general… would also have to be conditions of the existence of God” (B71). Strictly speaking, the 
latter claim is a mere tautology, but perhaps Kant’s underlying thought is that if one thing in 
itself is spatiotemporal, they all must be, because space and time are inherently general. This is an 
interesting principle, but not one Spinoza endorses. 
 Kant’s second reason for preferring Spinoza’s view is that Mendelssohn’s view “is 
contradictory to the concept of [God’s] infinity and independence” (2nd Critique 5:101). On 
Mendelssohn’s view, while God causes the existence of finite things, he “cannot be the cause of 
time (or space) itself,” because “this must be presupposed as a necessary a priori condition of the 
existence of things” (2nd Critique 5:101). Hence, on Mendelssohn’s view, God’s causality would 
be conditioned by space and time, contradicting his independence.  
Why couldn’t a Mendelssohnian respond here that God (not himself being 
spatiotemporal) created space and time before creating finite things, and so was not conditioned 
by them in a way that threatened his independence? Kant’s talk of a priori conditions might 
suggest that his answer would be that Mendelssohnians could not account for our a priori 
cognition of space and time. However, Kant holds that only his idealist view can secure that 
cognition (see, e.g., Prolegomena 4:283-4), so Spinozist realism would supposedly do no better 
than Mendelssohnian realism here. The first Critique again provides a helpful hint. There, Kant 
claims that it would be absurd to posit “two infinite things that are neither substances nor 
anything really inhering in substances” (B70-1, see also A39/B56). Kant does not explain why 
this would be absurd – he does not bring in epistemological considerations here, nor does he 
seem to be appealing to the PSR (contra Boehm 2014, 80-4). What is important, however, is 
                                                            
14 Drawing on A458/B486, Boehm proposes that Kant’s underlying principle here is that whatever grounds 
things of a type (e.g., spatiotemporal things) must be of the same type (Boehm 2014, 127-29). Yet Kant 
cannot endorse that principle in full generality, since he takes non-spatiotemporal noumena to ground 
spatiotemporal phenomena (e.g., A379-80, Prolegomena 5:314-15). 
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that this presumed absurdity would only be found in Mendelssohn’s view.15 For on Spinoza’s 
view, space (or, at least, extension) is an attribute of God, and time (duration) arises in God’s 
modes (See E1d6, E1p15s, E2d5). This reading fits with a passage from Kant’s lectures, where 
he states that “If I assume space to be a being in itself, then Spinozism is irrefutable, i.e., the 
parts of the world are parts of the divinity. Space is the divinity; it is united, all-present; nothing 
can be thought outside of it; everything is in it” (Metaphysics L2 28:567).16 
On most points, this argument is far from Spinoza’s views, not least since Spinoza treats 
space (extension) and time quite differently. Moreover, Spinoza does not obviously have a 
notion that aligns with Kant’s notion of space: physical bodies, for Spinoza, are mere modes of 
extension, whereas Kant would deny that physical bodies are modes of space (see, e.g., 
Metaphysical Foundations 4:497). Yet there is one point on which Kant’s argument does resemble 
Spinoza’s views: the claim that it would be absurd for anything to exist without being a 
substance or inhering in a substance.17 The first axiom of the Ethics is that “Whatever is, is 
either in itself or in another” (E1a1), implying (in conjunction with E1d3) that all things are 
substances or inhere in substances. Spinoza is not the only philosopher who accepts this view, 
however – it is widespread in the Aristotelian and rationalist traditions.   
Hence, Kant’s privileging of Spinozism among realist views seems generally detached 
from Spinoza’s actual thought. His discussion of Spinozism in the second Critique rests on broad 
(and misleading) characterizations of Spinoza’s philosophy in the writings of Jacobi and others. 
 
2. Points of Convergence 
 
 Setting aside questions of engagement, my concern in this section is with points at 
which Kant’s and Spinoza’s philosophy converged or came close to converging. We have already 
discussed one such point: both think that substance monism is more plausible than other 
traditional metaphysical views. I now consider two further philosophically interesting points 
which I think deserve further attention, one about the limits of sensory knowledge, and one 
about the timelessness of the mind. 
 
                                                            
15 Brewer and Watkins suggest, alternatively, that Kant holds that God could not create time because doing 
so would require that God represent time, which would in turn require that God have a sensible (passive) 
faculty of representation (Brewer and Watkins 2012, 171, though cf. Marshall 2018).  
16 This passage arguably indicates limited familiarity with Spinoza’s metaphysics, since Spinoza denies that 
God has parts (see E1p12-13, E1p15s). 
17 If we can set aside the (non-trivial) question about Spinoza’s extension vs. Kant’s space, then (as James 
Messina has helped me appreciate) both would presumably agree that the whole of space is prior to its parts 
(see E1p15s, A24-5/B39).  
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2.1. Short arguments to humility about sensory knowledge 
 
 Kant famously claims that we have cognition (Erkenntnis) only of appearances, not of 
things in themselves. Call this claim ‘Humility.’ Humility has been glossed as a claim about 
knowledge, but recent interpreters have shown that Kant’s notion of cognition is importantly 
different from contemporary notions of knowledge.18 Cognitions, for Kant, are conceptually-
determined representations of objects that are given to us in intuition (roughly: conceptualized 
perceptions).  
 There is ongoing debate about why Kant accepts Humility. His best-known arguments 
for it appeal to epistemological considerations about space and time (e.g., Prolegomena 4:281-82). 
Roughly, Kant argues that the only explanation for our a priori cognition of space and time is 
that they are mere forms of our sensory representations. Hence, since all our sensory experience 
is spatiotemporal, we are never directly presented with features of things in themselves. There 
is no obvious analogue of this epistemological argument in Spinoza. 
 Elsewhere, however, Kant seems to reach Humility without appealing to a priori 
cognition of space and time. These passages appear to involve what Karl Ameriks has 
(pejoratively) called “short arguments to idealism.”19 For example, in the Prolegomena Kant 
writes that:  
 
if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as is fitting, then we thereby 
admit… that a thing in itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with this 
thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e., with the way in 
which our senses are affected by this unknown something. (Prolegomena 4:314-15) 
 
Similarly, in the Groundwork: 
 
No subtle reflection is required to make the following remark… all representations 
which come to us involuntarily (as do those of the senses) enable us to cognize objects 
only as they affect us and we remain ignorant of what they may be in themselves 
(Groundwork 4:450-51). 
 
                                                            
18 E.g., Watkins and Willaschek 2017. 
19 See Ameriks 2003, 135. Ameriks denies that Kant relies on short arguments. See Langton 1998 for an 
influential short argument interpretation (unlike what I suggest below, Langton appeals to relationality, not 
passivity). 
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In these passages, Kant seems to infer Humility from passivity, that is, the fact that our sensory 
representations result from our being affected. This inference is not obviously valid. Why 
couldn’t God, for instance, affect us to produce an accurate representation of some thing in 
itself? 
 Bracketing questions of validity for now, these short arguments to Humility closely 
resemble a central argument from Part 2 of Spinoza’s Ethics. At E2p16 (drawing on A1’’ after 
E2p13), Spinoza claims that “[t]he idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by 
external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of 
the external body.” From this, he infers that “the ideas which we have of external bodies indicate 
the condition of our own body more than the nature of external bodies” (E2p16c2) and that 
“[t]he idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an 
external body” (E2p25).  
 On Spinoza’s view, then, any representation that results from our being affected must 
involve both our own nature and the nature of an external thing. This is arguably based on 
Spinoza’s view that inherence (being ‘in us’) involves explanatory dependence (being ‘conceived 
through’ – see E1d5). Hence, we cannot have any representation in us that purely reflects the 
nature of some external thing. This may help address the worry about the validity of Kant’s 
short arguments: the nature of inherence makes it metaphysically impossible for a 
representation to be in us that does not involve our own nature.20  
Surprisingly, Kant seems to say exactly this in his early metaphysics lectures, well 
before he conceived his mature arguments for Humility:  
 
Each subject in which an accident inheres must itself contain a ground of its inherence. 
For if, e.g., God could produce a thought in a soul merely by himself: then God, but not 
a soul, would have the thought… Thus for the inherence of an accident in A its own 
power is required (Metaphysics Herder, 28:52) 
 
There is, therefore, a surprising convergence between Spinoza on Kant in their short arguments 
for why sensory representations do not present us with unfiltered views of external things. 
 One might expect Spinoza’s and Kant’s epistemological similarities to stop here. Spinoza 
thinks we have adequate ideas of God’s essence (2p46), while Kant denies that we have 
theoretical insight into the nature of any thing in itself.  They would also count quite different 
                                                            
20 This does not fully answer the objection, though. Kant works with a sharp vehicle/content distinction, so 
our nature might be involved only in the vehicle of the representation, not its content. Spinoza arguably 
rejects a sharp a vehicle/content distinction (see E2p49s and §2.2 below), and so may be on stronger ground 
here. 
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things as being ‘external’ to us. Surprisingly, however, both seem drawn to a positive line of 
argument about the timelessness of the mind.  
 
2.2. Representational Content and the Timelessness of the Mind 
 
 Shortly after arguing for Humility in the Groundwork, Kant claims that “a human being 
really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes himself from all other things… 
reason,” and that he “must regard himself as intelligence (hence not from the side of his lower 
powers) as belonging not to the world of sense” (Groundwork 4:452). Since Kant holds that time 
exists only in the world of sense (see A33-5/B49-51), his claims imply that part of our mind is 
timeless, making room for some form of immortality (2nd Critique 5:122). Spinoza reaches a 
similar conclusion in the Ethics, claiming that “[t]he human Mind cannot be absolutely 
destroyed with the Body, but something of it remains which is eternal” (E5p23). Eternity, for 
Spinoza, “cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be 
without beginning or end” (E1d8). Hence both Spinoza and Kant argue that one part or aspect 
of the mind is timeless. 
 What is most striking, however, is that both Spinoza and Kant argue for this claim 
based on the content of our intellectual representations.21 The details of these arguments, which 
involve different assumptions, reveal subtle and important aspects of their respective views. 
 Kant claims that reason cannot belong to the temporal, sensory realm because reason, 
“as pure self-activity … shows in what we call ‘ideas’ a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes 
far beyond anything that sensibility can ever afford it” (Groundwork 4:452). Ideas, for Kant, are 
“concepts of pure reason” that “consider all experiential cognition through an absolute totality 
of conditions” (A327/B383-4). Ideas thus represent absolute totalities, which are too ‘big’ for 
sensibility to represent, since sensory representation “gives us no true universality” (A1). Kant 
makes a similar argument in the third Critique, focusing on infinity: “even to be able to think the 
given infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human mind that is itself 
supersensible” (3rd Critique 2:254-5). Only a truly self-active or spontaneous faculty could 
entertain such content, Kant holds. Yet the temporal world, on his view, is causally determined, 
leaving no room for spontaneity (see, e.g., A534/B562). Hence, some aspect of the mind must be 
timeless.22 
                                                            
21 Plato, from whom Kant borrows the term ‘idea’ (A313-17/B370-74), makes a similar argument in the 
Phaedo (see also Aristotle, De Anima 2.12 and 3.4).  
22 Though many contemporary Kant scholars read these passages as making metaphysical claims, some 
deny they have metaphysical import (see, e.g., Allison 1990). 
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 Spinoza’s official argument for the timelessness of the mind (E5p23d) appeals to his 
doctrines of the eternity of the body’s essence, the parallel between bodies and ideas, and his 
identification of the human mind with God’s idea of the human body. These last two doctrines 
are highly idiosyncratic, so Spinoza’s official argument is far removed from Kant’s views. 
However, in a scholium, Spinoza appears to offer a second argument: 
  
we feel and know by experience that we are eternal. For the mind feels those things that 
it conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of 
the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations themselves. 
(E5p23s) 
 
Spinoza does not call this argument a demonstration, so perhaps we should not put too much 
weight on it. Even so, the passage raises two questions. First, in what sense do we ‘feel’ or ‘see’ 
in demonstrations? Second, why should seeing things in demonstrations provide knowledge of 
the eternity of our mind? 
A contrast with Kant may be helpful. Unlike Kant, Spinoza does not deny that sensory 
representations can have ‘big’ contents; he holds that every idea involves adequate knowledge of 
God’s infinite essence (E2p45-46). In addition, while Kant appeals merely to ideas of totalities 
and infinities, Spinoza appeals to demonstrations. A demonstration may involve ideas (in Kant’s 
sense), but it also would seem to require truth, that is, that the ideas correspond to reality. 
These points are connected, for Spinoza holds that, unlike sensory knowledge, demonstrations 
teach us “to distinguish the true from the false” (E2p42). 
 Demonstrations, for Spinoza, concern eternal truths.  In E5p23s, he implies that all 
demonstrations let us experience our eternality. Yet how, as Spinoza says, is there an experience 
of our eternality in our apprehension of a demonstration? That is, why should a representation 
of eternal truths come with an experience of oneself being eternal? A principle from Spinoza’s 
early work, the Short Treatise, may be in play here. There, Spinoza claims that “whatever we find 
in ourselves has more power over us than anything which comes from outside” (KV II, 21; cf. 
4p9, 4p29).23 The underlying thought, then, may be that in demonstrations, eternal truths have 
a certain sort of psychological power over us, a power whereby they teach us how to distinguish 
truth from falsity. For demonstrations to have that power, though, the objects of the 
representations (the eternal truths) must be in us. Yet, in line with the principle about inherence 
mentioned in §2.1, it seems that something eternal can be in us (in the relevant sense) only if 
some part or aspect of ourselves is eternal. 
                                                            
23 For further discussion, see Marshall 2015.  
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 This line of thought differs from Kant’s argument. However, Kant also seems to think 
that a psychologically powerful representation must have a metaphysically proximate object. 
For example, in the first Critique, one of his arguments for space and time being in us (as forms 
of our sensibility) appeals to their power as representations, e.g., “[o]ne can never represent 
that there is no space” (A24/B38). In the second Critique, Kant talks of how the moral law 
“forces itself upon us”, and seems to take it as a corollary of this that the source of the moral law 
is in us, as our faculty of reason: “[p]ure reason… gives (to the human being) a universal law 
that is the moral law” (2nd Critique 5:31). Perhaps the basic thought here is that, if you can’t 
shake the representation of some object, then the object must somehow be in you, forcing you to 
represent it. Kant and Spinoza seem to agree on this point, though perhaps only Spinoza applies 
it to content-based arguments for the timelessness of the mind.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 I have argued that Kant was not meaningfully engaged with Spinoza’s actual 
philosophy. Despite that, and despite differences in their understandings of fundamental 
metaphysics, Spinoza and Kant’s philosophies come close at some surprising points. There are 
historical and philosophical questions about why this is. One exciting possibility is that such 
near-convergences among such independent thinkers provide evidence of truth. Whether that is 
so, or whether some less exciting explanation holds, calls for further investigation.24 
                                                            
24 For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to Martijn Buijs, Aaron Garrett, John Grey, Henk-Jan 
Hoekjen, Charlie Huenemann, Noam Hoffer, Jim Kreines, James Messina, Sam Newlands, Kristin Primus, 
Michael Rosenthal, Don Rutherford, Lisa Shapiro, Hasana Sharp, and Melanie Tate. 
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